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Abstract
We explore how integrating into the world economy aﬀects the in-
comes of manufacturers in less developed countries (LDCs). We show
that cutting back trade barriers has asymmetric eﬀects on the incomes of
the two typical groups of entrepreneurs. Whereas access to foreign mar-
kets beneﬁts those entrepreneurs who are able to run large-scale factories,
credit-rationed entrepreneurs running a micro ﬁrm lose. The reason is
simple. After the liberalization has taken place, wealthy entrepreneurs
a r en ol o n g e rr e s t r i c t e dt ot h e i rs m a l l home markets and increase factor
demand. The resulting increase in factor prices, in particular the rise of
the interest rate, hurts the relatively poor borrowers. We suggest that
these distributional consequences help to understand why attempts to
implement free trade policies may fail in LDCs characterized by a highly
unequal size-distribution of ﬁrms.
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11 Introduction
Although most developing countries abolished policies of diversiﬁcation and im-
port substitution some 20 or 30 years ago, the tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers that
were supposed to be temporary when erected in the 1950s and 1960s became
more or less permanent. Signiﬁcant trade liberalizations were not made un-
til the 1990s. However, despite this decline in trade barriers during the last
decade, the manufacturing sector in most less developed countries (LDCs) re-
mains relatively protected. For instance, average unweighted tariﬀs in Sub-
Saharan Africa in 1998 were roughly four times as high as in developed coun-
tries (World Bank, 2001). In addition, Latin American countries that cut trade
restrictions strongest turned to antidumping laws during the nineties in order to
substitute for tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ restrictions (World Bank, 2003). This is puz-
zling because those LDCs participating in the ”Third Wave of Globalization”
by scaling back trade barriers are also the countries with the most impressive
macroeconomic performance over the last two decades (World Bank, 2002).
The aim of this paper is to gain insights into the forces behind persistently
high trade barriers by looking at how integrating into the world market aﬀects
the incomes of the manufacturers in a LDC. We show that removing trade
barriers may have asymmetric eﬀects on the incomes of the two typical groups
of entrepreneurs in developing countries, namely the entrepreneurs operating
a relatively small ﬁrm and those entrepreneurs who have the internal funds to
run large-scale factories. A highly dualistic size-distribution of ﬁrms with a
large number of small family businesses, a small number of large enterprises
and almost no medium-sized ﬁrms (missing middle) is characteristic for the
manufacturing sector in LDCs (Tybout, 2000). Note that, in contrast to the
large literature on the ”political economy of trade policy”, we do not focus
on redistribution along industry lines (speciﬁc factor models, e.g. Grossman
and Helpman, 1994) or along factor lines (Heckscher-Ohlin models, e.g. Mayer,
1984 or Rogowski, 1989) but on the diﬀerent impact of trade liberalization on
the incomes of small and large monopolists, respectively. In particular, we show
2that trade liberalizations have a negative impact on the incomes of the owners
of small family businesses whereas the owners of large companies win.
The mechanism we focus on is simple. Suppose that there is a manufac-
turing sector consisting of a large number of monopolists and that the wealth
distribution among these monopolists is very uneven in the sense that few in-
dividuals own most of the capital. Indeed, throughout the developing world,
ownership of productive assets is highly concentrated (Deininger and Squire,
1998). However, due to the limited size of the home market under autarky, a
rich entrepreneur will not have invested the whole capital endowment into the
own ﬁrm. To escape strongly decreasing marginal returns and very low prices,
he will lend some capital to entrepreneurs that have to rely more or less on ex-
ternal ﬁnance. Being small compared to the market demand and consequently
facing relatively high mark-ups, owners of family businesses increase - relative
to a situation in ﬁnancial autarky - their ﬁrm sizes to the extent the (possibly
imperfect) capital market allows.
Suppose now that the trade barriers are signiﬁcantly cut back or removed
at all. In this new situation, wealthy entrepreneurs are no longer restricted
to the small domestic demand that forced them to charge low prices. Instead,
they can sell now any quantity they like at the prevalent world market price.
As a consequence, the rich lenders increase their ﬁrm sizes and shorten capital
supply. The incomes of the owners of micro enterprises are hit quite diﬀerently
by the opening. Due to the smaller capital supply, the interest rate rises. At
t h es a m et i m et h ep r i c e sf o rg o o d sm a n u f actured by the small fall. The reason
for the price collapse of these goods is simple. After integrating into the world
economy, these goods are no longer ”scarce” since they can be imported at any
quantity from abroad.
T h es i z eo ft h e s ea s y m m e t r i ce ﬀects on the incomes of the poorer and the
richer entrepreneurs depends on essentially two factors. First, we show that -
for a given distribution of capital endowments - the large manufacturers gain a
lot and the owners of small ﬁrms lose relatively little when the credit markets
are poorly developed. In such a situation, the provision of goods is very uneven
3and, as a consequence, aggregate demand is low. This hurts all monopolistic
producers but in particular the large ones. Second, given the level of ﬁnancial
development, the rich can win more when the distribution is very uneven. The
reason is that an unequal distribution of capital endowments drives down the
interest rate - given the capital market is imperfect. For the same reason, we
expect the poor to lose a lot when the distribution is characterized by a ”missing
middle”.
As just outlined, an important stylized fact about the manufacturing sec-
tor in LDCs is that the size-distribution of ﬁrms is highly dualistic. A major
obstacle that prevents small establishments from becoming large is imperfect en-
forcement of credit contracts (or in general poor law enforcement) which makes
capital markets imperfect. In such a situation, access to credit is limited in
particular for small ﬁrms since they lack either an appropriate collateral or rep-
utation (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys, 2002) or both. The signiﬁcance of capital
market imperfections is documented in a number of empirical papers, among
them Nugent and Nabli (1992), Banerjee and Duﬂo (2002) and Sleuwaegen and
Goedhuys (2002). For simplicity, we abstract in our model from any other chan-
nel and focus on capital market imperfections (in interaction with the wealth
distribution) as the central element leading to an uneven size-distribution and
limiting the incomes of the owners of small ﬁrms. However, we are well aware of
the fact that there exist many other factors that adversely aﬀect in particularly
or solely entrepreneurs running small ﬁrms (Little, 1987). But we challenge
the view put forth by many scholars (e.g. Tybout, 2000) that a protection-
ist trade regime in a monopolistic environment favors entrepreneurs running a
large-scale factory. We provide theoretical arguments - along the lines already
presented above - that in particular owners of credit-rationed family businesses
take advantage of obstacles to trade.
Given this asymmetric impact of obstacles to trade on the incomes of en-
trepreneurs we suggest that the actual trade policy in a country mirrors in parts
the two diﬀerent groups’ relative strength in the political process.1 At this point,
1In the early stages of a country’s economic development, the workforce consists in large
4a look at Latin America’s 19th century economic history is quite illustrative.
At the beginning of the century, the agricultural (for instance in Argentina and
Brazil) and the mining sector (for instance in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru) were
dominant in the young, recently independent Latin American economies. Other
industries played a minor role (Thorp, 1998). Running large-scale plantations
or mines and hence producing mainly for the world market, landowners and
mineral exporters were strongly in favour of free trade and against import re-
strictions (Coatsworth and Williamson, 2002). Cardoso and Faletto (1979) even
argue that direct access to export markets in Europe, primarily in England, was
one of the central motivations behind the Latin America’s producers ﬁght for
independence from the crown. As a consequence, import tariﬀs were relatively
low in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century.2 However, during the century, new
(infant) industries owned by an urban elite emerged. Running relatively small
enterprises, the ”urban capitalist” as well as the artisans fought for the protec-
tion of domestic industry. Since these groups exerted disproportionate lobbying
inﬂuence on politicians, average tariﬀs experienced a major increase towards the
end of the century.3
Trade policies that led to strong redistribution between rural and urban ar-
eas can also be found in African history. After independence, in many African
countries export marketing boards (that were established by the colonial powers
to stabilize incomes in presence of ﬂuctuating commodity prices) started to tax
heavily the exports of outward-oriented industries (primarily in the agricultural
sector). It is often argued in the literature (e.g. Bates, 1981) that this export
taxation not only served to generate revenue for the government but was also
designed to keep domestic commodity prices low and to direct productive re-
sources towards urban infant industries (that, of course, were highly protected
parts of entrepreneurs or own-account workers. See Gollin (2000), Table 1.
2Note, however, that average tariﬀsi nL a t i nA m e r i c aw e r eh i g hc o m p a r e dt oE u r o p eo r
Asia (Coatsworth and Williamson, 2002). Centeno (1997) underlines that this fact may be
rooted in the young countries’ low capacity to tax income or wealth. So, custom taxes which
are easily collected were a perfect solution to ﬁscal problems.
3See Coatsworth and Williamson (2002), Figure 2a.
5from foreign competition).
Note that our model diﬀers in several dimensions from models, among them
Mayer’s (1984) median-voter model and Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) special-
interest group model, that contributed to the literature on ”the political econ-
omy of trade policy”. Focussing on a for LDCs characteristic environment, that
is on imperfect markets in presence of high wealth inequality, we are interested
in redistribution among rich an poor capital owners as a result of major trade
liberalization steps. Consequently, we do not allow for industry-speciﬁct a r i ﬀs
or subsidies. The analysis presented here is on a higher level of aggregation. Our
aim is not to explain cross-industry variations in tariﬀs but to analyze the dis-
tributional consequences of the decision to join or to absent from an integration
agreement that aﬀects import or export restrictions for the whole manufactur-
ing sector. In addition, consistent with the focus on the broad lines of trade
policy, our model does not comprise speciﬁc factors. Instead, we are interested
in the distribution of and the returns to the mobile factor (here capital) and
highlight the role of factor market imperfections.4
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section (2) sets up the basic
model for a closed economy and shows existence and uniqueness of the equi-
librium. In Section (3), we derive comparative static results. In particular, we
discuss the impact of changes in the level of ﬁnancial development or the wealth
distribution on both the size-distribution of ﬁrms and the income distribution.
The eﬀects of trade liberalisations on the size-distribution of ﬁr m sa sw e l lo n
the income distribution are explored in Section (4). Section (5) concludes.
4Trade policy cannot aﬀect the return to the ”mobile” factor in Grossman and Helpman
(1994) because there is a freely traded numeraire good that is manufactured with constant
returns to scale form the ”mobile” factor alone. Mayer’s (1984) analysis in Section III assumes
that the ”mobile” factor is equally distributed among the individuals.
62 The Model
2.1 Preferences, and the Goods Market Structure
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals. The population size is
normalized to 1. The individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their initial
capital endowment ω(i),i ∈ [0,1], but otherwise identical. The initial wealth
endowments are distributed according to the distribution function G(ω), which
gives the measure of the population with wealth less than ω.
Beside this wealth endowment, each individual has access to a technology
that allows to transform 1 capital unit into 1 unit of a diﬀerentiated product.
In addition, we make the crucial assumption that these individual technologies
cannot be sold or imitated, i.e. we assume that each individual is personally
endowed with a special business skill. This assumption seems to be appropriate
since we focus on developing countries where family businesses (that transfer
family speciﬁc human capital down through the generations) account for the
overwhelming part of economic activity (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001).
As a consequence, each individual is a monopoly supplier of a single, diﬀerenti-
ated good. Note that, as long as the economy is closed, the continuum of goods
is of the same mass as the continuum of individuals. Free trade may enlarge
t h es p e c t r u mo fa v a i l a b l eg o o d st oh o m er e s i d e n t s . The results presented in this
section are derived for a closed economy, but they can easily be extended to an
open one as it is done in Section 4.














, σ > 1, (1)
where c(j) is consumption of good j. Note that all goods enter the utility func-
tion symmetrically. Hence, each monopolist faces the same isoelastic demand




p(j)c(j)dj = y(ω(i)), (2)
where p(j) is the price of good j. y(ω(i)) is deﬁned as individual i’s (nominal)
income. The exact functional relationship between income and initial wealth is
speciﬁed in Subsection 2.3. Under these conditions, individual i’s demand for











is the familiar CES price index. In a goods
market equilibrium, aggregate demand for good j must be equal to its supply
which is, due to the linear technology, equal to the capital invested into individ-
ual j’s ﬁrm. As it is shown in the following subsection, the amount of capital
entrepreneur j invest into his ﬁrm depends on his wealth endowment. There-
fore, entrepreneur j’s amount of investment (ﬁrm size, project size) is denoted
by k(ω(j)). The goods market equilibrium condition allows us to express the













0 p(j)k(ω(j))dj is the nominal output in our economy. Note that,
in a goods market equilibrium, the real price is strictly decreasing in the ﬁrm
size k(ω(j)). The reason is simple. A larger investment translates one-to-one
into higher output. Since the marginal utility from consuming a given good
decreases in the quantity consumed, the consumers can only be induced to buy
higher quantities by lower prices.
Later on, it will be very helpful to have an expression for the real output
(aggregate real income) that depends only on the size-distribution of ﬁrms.
















8Henceforth we use P =1a st h en u m ´ eraire. This implies that nominal output
equals real output. In addition, for ease of notation, we do not distinguish
between the indices for goods and the indices for individuals.
2.2 The Capital Market
As mentioned above, the technology each individual is endowed with cannot be
transferred form one agent to another. This is not true for the wealth endow-
ments. Capital can be exchanged across individuals, and each capital unit has
the same productivity no matter to which ﬁrm the unit is allocated. However,
we assume that the capital market is imperfect in the sense that borrowing at
the equilibrium interest rate is limited. Following Matsuyama (2000) in the
modelling of capital market imperfection, credit-rationing arises from imperfect
enforcement of (credit) contracts.5 The micro foundation for the capital market
imperfection chosen here seems to be highly relevant for developing countries.
Many authors stress that access to debt (but also equity) in LDCs is frequently
limited because of poor collateral law and weak judicial law, making it hard to
enforce contracts in a court.6 In the event of default, borrower i loses only a frac-
tion λ ∈ (0,1] of his project output p(i)k(i). The parameter λ c a nb ev i e w e da s
a measure for the level of ﬁnancial development. A small λ means that creditor
rights are poorly developed whereas a value close to 1 stands for strong creditor
protection. Note that poor law enforcement prevents individuals in our model
also from overcoming the credit market imperfection by pooling their wealth
endowment. Indeed, La Porta et. al. (1998) provide some empirical evidence
showing that poor legal protection results in high ownership concentration.
Taking into account the borrower’s incentives, a lender will only give credit
up to λp(i)k(i)/ρ where ρ denotes the equilibrium interest rate. So, a borrower
will never renege on his debt in equilibrium. The maximum amount k(ω(i))
that entrepreneur i can invest is then given by k(ω(i)) = ω(i)+λ
ρp(i)k(ω(i)).
5This type of credit market imperfections, also known as costly state veriﬁcation, was ﬁrst
introduced by Townsend (1979).
6World Bank (2001) reviews this literature.








Equation (6) determines k(ω(i)) implicitly and can only be solved explicitly
if ω(i)=0 . In this case, the project size k(0) is given by (λ/ρ)
σ Y and the





Note that p(k(0)) is the highest price that is paid in equilibrium since the prices
decrease in the ﬁrm size. In the lemma below, we show that the maximum
amount of credit and, consequently, the maximum investment depend positively
on the initial capital endowment. That is, initial wealth plays the role of a
collateral in our model. So, we get the intuitive result that wealthier individuals
may run larger ﬁrms. However the impact of an additional wealth unit on the
ﬁrm size decreases in the wealth level. This is because marginal return falls when
the ﬁrm grows large. Since initial wealth is the only source of heterogeneity
among individuals, the index for individuals will be dropped for the rest of this
section. That is, we write k(ω)i np l a c eo fk(ω(i)) if convenient.
Lemma 1 Given an interest rate ρ, the maximum investment size is strictly
increasing and concave in the initial capital endowment.








and must be positive since the highest price paid in equilibrium is ρ/λ (equation
7). Having established a positive relationship between k and ω,e q u a t i o n( 4 )t e l l s
us that
d2k(ω)
dω2 must be negative.
If not restricted by the capital market imperfection, an entrepreneur in-




σ Y 1/σk is equal to the equilibrium interest rate ρ (marginal costs). So, the
10optimal project size, denote it by e k, and the initial wealth endowment that
allows exactly for this project size, denote it by e ω, are given by
























respectively. As can be seen from equation (9), there exists a group of restricted
entrepreneurs if and only if λ < σ−1
σ .I n s t e a d ,i fλ ≥ σ−1
σ , even individuals with
zero capital endowment can choose the opimal ﬁrm size and will produce at
the point where marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Why? The smaller σ
(the elasticity of demand), the higher is the constant mark-up σ
σ−1 over marginal
costs ρ. So, even for poor individuals, the project output relative to the payment
obligation is large if σ is small. This means that only a strong capital market
imperfection (a very low λ) leads a borrower to renege on his debt. Put in
other terms, the capital market imperfection is binding for some individuals in
equilibrium if and only if the imperfection in the capital market is larger than
the imperfection in the product market.
We are now ready to discuss the size-distribution of ﬁrms. The project sizes
of individuals with initial endowment between 0 and e ω are implicitly determined
by equation (6). By Lemma 1, the ﬁrm sizes of these entrepreneurs increase in
the initial wealth endowment ω. Individuals whose endowments lie in the range
[e ω,e k]i n v e s te k and borrow the diﬀerence e k − ω. Finally, very rich individuals
(ω > e k) manage a ﬁrm of size e k and, in addition, act as lenders. So, given
that the capital market is imperfect, an uneven distribution of initial wealth
endowments and an uneven size-distribution of ﬁr m sg oh a n di nh a n d . T h e









ω < e ω
ω ≥ e ω
(10)
11Since each ﬁrm faces the downward-sloping demand curve (4), the prices across
goods diﬀer as well. Larger ﬁrms charge lower prices - despite the fact that each
good enters the utility function symmetrically.
The preceding discussion leads us directly to a speciﬁcation of aggregate











Since the project sizes of both the restricted and unrestricted individuals depend
on ρ, aggregate capital demand depends on ρ as well. In contrast, aggregate cap-
ital is exogenous and therefore inelastically supplied: KS = E[ω]=
R ∞
0 ωdG(ω).
The following proposition focuses on the capital market equilibrium. The equi-
librium is shown in Figure 2.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique capital market equilibrium.
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst focus on the case λ < σ−1
σ (credit-rationing). It is not
possible to compute aggregate (gross-) capital demand explicitly. However, we
can show that capital demand decreases uniformly in ρ. Since (gross-) capital
demand is the sum over all individual project sizes, we have to determine how








































respectively. By Lemma 1, the denominator of the ﬁrst equation is positive.
Holding Y constant, an increase in the interest rate decreases both k(ω)a n de k.
This means that dY/dρ must be negative (equation 5) as well. Thus, taking into
account that Y adjusts endogenously reinforces the direct eﬀect of the increase
in the interest rate. So, we have to show that dY/dρ is greater than minus
















Using the expression for dk(ω)/dρ and de k/dρ in the above equation and rear-








































Note that dY/dρ is greater than minus inﬁnity if and only if the term in brackets
is strictly smaller than 1. Assume for a short while that x(ω)e q u a l s1f o ra l l
ω. In this case, the term in brackets is exactly 1. Thus, a suﬃcient condition







σ for some ω < e ω. This is equivalent to λp(k(ω))/ρ < 1
for some ω < e ω. Since the price of goods of individuals with endowment zero
is given by ρ/λ (equation 7) and the prices are decreasing in the ﬁrm size
(equation 4), the latter inequality holds for all individuals with ω > 0. Hence,
we may conclude that capital demand decreases uniformly in ρ. It is easy to
see that KD reaches zero at ρ = σ−1
σ . In this situation, we have e k = Y =
hR e ω
0 k∗(ω)(σ−1)/σdG(ω)+( 1− G(e ω))e k(σ−1)/σ
iσ/(σ−1)
, where the ﬁrst equality
follows from equation (8). Since k∗(ω) < e k ∀ ω < e ω and e ω > 0, the only solution
to the above equation is e k = e ω = 0 which means that capital demand is zero.
From equation (6) we know that KD goes to inﬁnity as ρ approaches λ from
above. Since capital supply is constant, we can conclude that there exists a
unique equilibrium.
(ii) Assume now that λ ≥ σ−1
σ (no credit-rationing). In this situation, capital
demand can easily be computed and is given by
R ∞
0
e kdG(ω)=Y ρ−σ ¡σ−1
σ
¢σ.
13Since all agents run a ﬁrm of the same size, (gross-) capital supply, KS, can be
written as e k = Y. Hence, the equilibrium interest rate, which can be calculated
by equating capital demand and capital supply, is completely independent of
capital supply and equals σ−1
σ . This means that the capital demand curve is
horizontal at σ−1
σ .
Finally, consider the case λ = 0, a situation characterized by absent creditor
rights, in which default is not followed by sanctions. Under these circumstances,
the equilibrium is easily derived as the capital market does not exist at all. No
borrower would ever honour his debt and, consequently, there are no lenders.
In this benchmark case, the ﬁrm size of each agent would be given by his initial
capital endowment.
2.3 The Income Distribution
This subsection explores how the distribution of the initial capital endowments
and the income distribution are related. To this end we look at the function






p(e k)e k +( ω − e k)ρ
:
:
ω < e ω
ω ≥ e ω
(12)
The following lemma shows that income is a concave function of initial wealth.
Hence the income distribution is more equal than the distribution of capital
endowments.
Lemma 2 In an equilibrium, an individual’s income is strictly increasing and
concave in his initial capital endowment.

















ω < e ω
ω ≥ e ω
(13)
The signs of both the upper and the lower expression in the above equation
are positive (see proof of Lemma 1). Whereas ρ is constant in an equilibrium,
14the behaviour of dy/dω remains to be discussed if ω < e ω. By Lemma 1, k
is positively related to ω and by equation (4), the price decreases in the ﬁrm
size. This means that the larger the initial capital endowment, ω, the smaller
the numerator and the bigger the denominator. Hence, if e ω > 0, the marginal
return decreases until e ω is reached and then remains constant.
By showing that y is strictly concave as long as ω < e ω, the above lemma
makes immediately clear that the income distribution must be more equal than
t h ee n d o w m e n td i s t r i b u t i o ni nt h ec a s ew h e r ee ω > 0. This statement remains
true if λ ≥ σ−1
σ and, consequently, e ω = 0. In that case, the income function
takes the simple form Y/σ + σ−1
σ ω. So, as long as the ﬁrms have monopoly
power, the income distribution is more equal than the wealth distribution. This
is an important point. In a closed economy (where big companies may not
export parts of their production), wealthy entrepreneurs are forced to become
lenders because of the limited size of the home market. Due to monopoly price
setting, the equilibrium interest rate will be lower than the marginal product of
capital. This beneﬁts the owners of family businesses and hurts export-oriented
entrepreneurs running large-scale factories.
3 Financial Development and Inequality
This section explores how variations in the level of ﬁnancial development, λ,
and variations in the distribution of initial capital endowments aﬀect both the
income distribution and the size-distribution of ﬁrms. We use the Dalton Prin-
ciple (Dalton, 1920) to rank these distributions with respect to inequality. That
is, if one distribution can be achieved from another by constructing a sequence
of regressive transfers, i.e. transfers from a set poorer individuals (smaller ﬁrms)
to a set of richer individuals (bigger ﬁrms), then the former distribution is more
unequal than the latter. Note that, because of decreasing marginal contribution
to real output with respect to individual ﬁrm sizes (equation 5), a more uneven
size-distribution of ﬁrms translates into a lower real output, Y.
Our ﬁrst aim is to determine, how a variation in λ aﬀects the size-distribution
15of ﬁrms, real output, and the income distribution for a given distribution of the
initial endowments (Subsection 3.1). In Subsection 3.2 we discuss the eﬀects of
a regressive transfer of the initial capital endowments and hold λ constant.
3.1 Variation in the Capital Market Eﬃciency
Size-Distribution of Firms. The two polar cases, namely (i) λ ≥ σ−1
σ and
(ii) λ = 0 were already brieﬂy discussed in the previous section. (i) A near
perfect capital market leads to perfect equity in the size-distribution of ﬁrms.
The reason is simple. If the legal system works reasonably well, the fraction
of the monopoly proﬁt that is lost conditional on default is high even for a
monopolist who has no initial capital endowment. So, also initially very poor
individuals will honour the dept - even when they run large ﬁrms. Hence,
credit-rationing does not occur. Firm sizes will fully equalize since each ﬁrm
has the same technology, faces the same demand curve and sets the same proﬁt-
maximizing price. So, in our model, full equity is the ”natural” (Nugent and
Nabli, 1992) size-distribution, i.e. the size-distribution that would emerge on
the basis of technology and market size alone. By equation (5), real output is
maximized. (ii) In the opposite case, if λ = 0, the distribution of the initial
capital endowments and the size-distribution of ﬁrms are identical. This means
that the latter is more unequal than in a situation with an existent, but imperfect
capital market. By equation (5), real output is minimized. The impact of an
arbitrary change in λ on the size-distribution of ﬁrms and on the real output is
given in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 Ad e c l i n ei nλ leads to a more uneven size-distribution of ﬁrms
and decreases real output and the interest rate.
Proof. The ﬁrm sizes of the restricted and the unrestricted entrepreneurs
are determined by k(ω(i)) = ω(i)+λXk(ω(i))(σ−1)/σ and e k = Xσ [(σ − 1)/σ]
σ,
where X ≡ Y 1/σ/ρ. It is immediately clear that X may not fall when λ decreases
since, in such a case, both the restricted and unrestricted entrepreneurs would
16invest less, and, consequently, capital supply would exceed capital demand. It
is also obvious that λX must be smaller in the new equilibrium than in the
old. Otherwise, each entrepreneur would invest more than before and capital
demand would exceed capital supply. Since X must rise and λX must fall, the
ﬁrm sizes in the new equilibrium are smaller up to a certain b ω and are higher
above this threshold level (see Figure 3). According to our deﬁnition, the size-
distribution of ﬁrms is more unequal in the new equilibrium. By equation (5),
the marginal contribution to real output of a high − k ﬁrm is lower than that
of a low − k ﬁrm.Hence, real output decreases (k(j) ≡ k(ω(i))). Now, we can
immediately conclude that the interest rate must fall as well.
We conclude that the link between the two distributions is very close if the
capital market is poorly developed and that there is only a weak relationship if
λ is close to 1.
Note that from the above proof follows immediately that the marginal impact





1 − λXk(ω(i))−1/σ σ−1
σ
, (14)
is small if the capital market is poorely developed. In the above expression, a
small λ leads to both a small nominator and a large denominator.
Income Distribution. We start again with a discussion of the two po-
lar cases. (i) As noted earlier, y(ω)|λ≥(σ−1)/σ equals Y/σ + σ−1
σ ω, where σ−1
σ
is the equilibrium interest rate. (ii) If capital markets are absent (λ =0 ) ,
the income is simply given by the revenue generated by running a ﬁrm of
size ω: y(ω)|λ=0 = Y 1/σω(σ−1)/σ.7 Note that the function y(ω)|λ≥(σ−1)/σ
does not depend on the distribution of initial capital endowments whereas
y(ω)|λ=0 = Y 1/σω(σ−1)/σ clearly does (remember the above discussion of re-
gressive transfers). It is obvious that any y(ω)|λ>0-curve must lie everywhere
above the y(ω)|λ=0-line. Clearly, all individuals are better oﬀ in the new situ-
ation since demand has increased. For the wealthy individuals, there is even a
7Of course, the output Y depends on λ and on the distribution of capital endowments (if
λ < σ
σ−1).
17second positive eﬀect. They face not only higher prices but can escape dimin-
ishing returns to investment by becoming lenders on the credit market. This
allows the small entrepreneurs to borrow and to increase their ﬁrm sizes. It is
exactly this channel through which real output increases.
What happens when λ is increased from some arbitrary positive level? It
turns out that the results are no longer so unambiguous as in the discussion
above. There are three eﬀects. First, there is the positive eﬀect mentioned
above of an upward-shift of the individual demand functions due to rising Y on
both the borrowers’ and the lenders’ incomes. Second, with λ and Y higher, in-
dividuals can borrow more and therefore individuals with wealth ω < ˜ ω increase
their ﬁrm size k(ω)g i v e nρ. This increases wealth too (as marginal revenue ex-
ceeds marginal costs for constrained agents). However, there is a third eﬀect: a
better working legal system leads to a higher interest rate because the upward
shift in capital demand clearly beneﬁt st h el e n d e r s . D u et ot h er i s ei nρ, the
interest payments of the borrowers increase as well. For net borrowers, this
negative inﬂuence on their incomes may be stronger than the positive demand
eﬀect.8 But it can been shown that this is very unlikely to be the case if λ is
low.
3.2 Wealth Inequality
Size-Distribution of Firms. Again, the two polar cases are quickly discussed.
If the capital markets are near-perfect (λ ≥ σ−1
σ ), all ﬁrms are of equal size
hence the distribution of initial capital endowments has no inﬂuence on the



























The three terms on the right-hand side of the equation capture, in turn, the three eﬀects
mentioned in the text. In the above proposition we proved that dY
dλ > 0a n d dk
dλ > 0. Using
(6) it is straightforward to show that dk
dY > 0.
18the equilibrium if the inequality is low: If the wealth of the poorest individual
is larger than ˜ w, every entrepreneur will choose the optimal unconstrained ﬁrm
size ˜ k. Using (9) we then see that ﬁrm sizes will be equalized if w ≥ ˜ w =
³
1 − λ σ
σ−1
´
E[w]w h e r ew denotes the wealth of the poorest agent (note that
˜ k = Ks = E[w] in the symmetric equilibrium). Obviously, this condition will
be violated more easily if λ is low. This leads us to the other polar case: if the
capital market is inexistent (λ =0 ) , the size-distribution of ﬁr m si si d e n t i c a l
to the wealth distribution. As a surprise we will see that the link between the
distribution of initial capital endowments and the size-distribution of ﬁrms is
ambiguous if lies between the two polar cases. Not every regressive transfer of
endowment units - which, according to our deﬁnition, increases unambiguously
the inequality in the endowment distribution - results in a more unequal size-
distribution of ﬁrms.
First note that a regressive transfer from one set of unrestricted individuals
to another will not aﬀect the size-distribution of ﬁrms. The former group of
individuals decreases its net capital supply exactly to the same extent as the
latter increases net capital supply. Thus, the project sizes of the involved in-
dividuals remain unaﬀected. This is also true for all aggregate variables. This
argumentation becomes more complicated if we redistribute from restricted in-
dividuals. To discuss this type of redistribution properly we have - as a ﬁrst
step - to prove some helpful facts. This is done in the lemma below.
Lemma 3 (i) A regressive transfer decreases ρ and increases X. (ii) Bigger
ﬁrms may expand their project sizes to a greater extent than smaller ﬁrms if
X = Y 1/σ
ρ rises.
Proof. (i) The regressive transfer decreases - given ρ, Y, and therefore
X = Y 1/σ/ρ - (gross-) capital demand: The restricted recipients may increase
their capital demand only to a smaller extent than the poor donors are forced to
decrease their capital demand (Lemma 1) and the unrestricted recipients even
leave their capital demand unchanged (equation 8). Now, assume that ρ remains
constant or increases. Given this assumption and the preceding argumentation,
19we know that the real output Y must fall. However, this decline decreases capital
demand again. Hence, capital supply exceeds capital demand. We conclude that
ρ must fall to restore the equality of capital demand and supply. The sign of
the change in X follows now immediately. We know from above that, if X is
held constant, a regressive transfer decreases capital demand. If X turns out to
be smaller in the new equilibrium, capital demand is reduced again. Hence, it
is necessary that X increases.
(ii) The sign of d[dk(ω)/dX]/dk(ω) is determined by the sign of 1−λp(k(ω))/ρ.
We know from equation (7) that the highest price in the economy is ρ/λ. All
individuals with a positive capital endowment (and therefore bigger ﬁrm sizes)
charge lower prices. Our claim immediately follows.
Since any endowment transfer from a set of restricted poorer individuals to
a set of richer individuals (whether restricted or not plays no role) decreases
the interest rate (Lemma 3, (i)), some poor individuals - who are possibly not
involved into the transfer - may increase their ﬁrm size. Due to this general
equilibrium eﬀect, the new size-distribution of ﬁrms cannot be deemed more
unequal than the original size-distribution. For the same reason, we may not
conclude that an arbitrary regressive transfer decreases real output: The indirect
interest rate eﬀect - leading to bigger project sizes of the non-involved poor -
can outweigh the direct negative eﬀect of a regressive transfer.9 However, this
eﬀect is the smaller the less developed the capital market is (equation 14), and
it vanishes if the capital market is inexistent. Put in other terms, redistribution
from individuals with high marginal returns to investment to individuals with
a low marginal return does not necessarily reduce output because the interest
rate falls. Hence, the central intuition of models characterized by absent capital
markets (e.g. B´ enabou, 1996) does, in general, not go through if we consider
intermediate levels of capital market imperfections.
An unambiguous prediction about the impact of a regressive transfer on both
the size-distribution of ﬁrms and the real output can be made if the transfer
9This can be shown, for example, in a simple case where the population is divided into two
classes and a certain share of the population is assumed to have no wealth endowment at all.
20involves the set of the poorest restricted individuals (no matter how large this
set is). This can be seen as follows. If we decrease the wealth endowment of
the poorest (say) z percent of the population by a given amount per person,
the interest rate decreases (and X increases). Hence, all recipients but also all
non-involved individuals increase their ﬁrm sizes. So, the group of the poorest
z percent of the population may invest less in the new equilibrium. But we
can even say more. Because the increase in X aﬀects the richer in this set of
”poor individuals” stronger (Lemma 3, ( i i ) )i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h a tt h e
smallest ﬁrms have to cut down their ﬁrms sizes most, and so on. Thus, we may
conclude that a regressive transfer involving the poorest part of the population
leads to a more uneven size-distribution of ﬁrms and decreases real output. To
summarize, the main ﬁndings of this subsection are stated in the proposition
below.
Proposition 3 Redistribution of initial capital endowments from poorer, credit-
rationed individuals to richer individuals tends to decrease real output. A regres-
sive transfer that involves the set of poorest individuals results unambiguously
in a more uneven size-distribution of ﬁrms and in a lower output.
Income Distribution. Under near-perfect capital markets (λ ≥ σ−1
σ ),
the incomes of the individuals that are not involved into the regressive trans-
fer remain unaﬀected since demand does not change. Under inexistent capital
markets (λ = 0), the incomes of the not involved individuals decrease rela-
tively to the same extent. So, given these indirect (general equilibrium) eﬀects
of a regressive transfer, we conclude that, in the two polar cases, the income
distribution becomes more unequal as consequence of a regressive transfer.
For intermediate levels of capital market imperfection, a clear-cut prediction
how the income of the not involved individuals is aﬀected cannot be made. To
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21Consider ﬁrst the more likely case in which redistribution adversely aﬀects out-
put. The impact on the wealth of the restricted individuals is ambiguous. On
the one hand, demand decreases. On the other hand, the fall in the interest rate
not only allows the restricted entrepreneurs to run larger ﬁrms (Lemma 3) but
also reduces their interest payments. This is exactly the reason why at least the
very wealthy lenders lose. The situation becomes clearer if, as a consequence of
a regressive transfer, output increases. In this situation, the income of the not
involved restricted individuals improves for sure since they are not only able to
run larger ﬁrms now but demand has shifted up as well. Again, the income of
the very rich is adversely aﬀected since their income consists in large parts of
interest payments and the interest rate has fallen. So, we conclude that the gen-
eral equilibrium eﬀects that occur when a regressive transfer is carried out tend
to have asymmetric eﬀects on the incomes of the poor and rich, respectively.
4 Integrating into the World Economy
This section explores the distributional consequences of scaling back trade bar-
riers, i.e. the changes in manufacturers’ incomes due to an integration into
the North’ competitive goods markets. In addition, we show how the distribu-
tional consequences depend on the level of ﬁnancial development and the wealth
distribution.
Trade Restrictions. Note that, until now, it was assumed that the trade
barriers were suﬃciently high to make trade between the North and the South
impossible. To gain analytical tractability and simplicity we focus on the case
where the tariﬀs or non-tariﬀ barriers that prohibited either imports or exports
or both are cut back to zero. In addition, we assume that there are no other
obstacles to trade such as transportation costs between the North and the South.
So, the law of one price holds for every good.
Goods Markets Structure. The world is now populated by a continuum
of individuals (producers). The populations size is L. The South consists of
individuals on the interval [0,1]. The remaining individuals are located in the
22North. With respect to the number of diﬀerent goods we discuss two polar cases.
In Subsection 4.1, we assume that goods produced in the North are imperfect
substitutes to the ones manufactured in the South such that continuum of goods
available in the integrated market is given by [0,L]. This means that the pro-
ducers in the South can perpetuate their monopoly power. In Subsection 4.2,
exactly the opposite case is discussed. The goods produced in the North and
the South are perfect substitutes. As a consequence, the integration removes
the monopoly power of the South’ manufacturers. In that case, the continuum
of goods is given by [0,1]. Individuals elsewhere have the same preferences. The
preferences are similar to those in equation (1). The upper limit in the integral
is given by L or 1, respectively.
Technology. Manufacturers in the South and in the North have access
to the same linear technology, i.e. goods are produced in both regions with
the same marginal costs. This assumption is just to make things as simple as
possible. The distributional consequences of a trade liberalization to be derived
below do not hinge on this assumption. In particular, a lower productivity in
the South would only aﬀect the absolute value of the income of an entrepreneur
b u tn o tt h er e l a t i v ec h a n g ei ni n c o m ea f t e rt h ec o u n t r yh a si n t e g r a t e di n t ot h e
world economy. Since technology is the same across regions, total output of
good j is given by sum of capital invested into its production, kW(j). So, for
the rest of this section we replace k(j) in equations (4) and (5) by kW(j)s u c h
that Y refers now to worldwide real output.10
Capital Markets. We further assume that neither entrepreneurs nor cap-
ital is mobile across regions. As a consequence, the interest rates in North and
the South may diﬀer. The capital market in the North is assumed to be perfect
whereas the South (possibly) suﬀers form an imperfect ﬁnancial system. In-
deed, there is little doubt that there is a strong relationship between the level
of ﬁnancial development and level of economic activity. For instance, Levine
(1997), based on work of King and Levine (1993), provides evidence showing
that there is a strong correlation between four diﬀerent measures of ﬁnancial
10As in the previous sections, the price level is normalized to 1.
23development and the GDP per capita. As our last assumption, we presume that
the aggregate capital endowment in the North is large relative to that in the
South in a sense to be made precise in Subsection 4.2.
4.1 Imperfect Substitutes
Since there is a perfect capital market in the North, the ”natural” size-distribution,
i.e. full equality in the ﬁrm sizes, results in the North under autarky. So, the
ﬁrm sizes are given by kN ≡
R L
1 ω(i)di/(L − 1). Note that neither the size-
distribution nor the ﬁrm sizes in the North change when we move from autarky
to perfectly integrated goods markets. The integration increases the market size
of all manufacturers to the same extent. Hence, the relative ﬁrm sizes do not
change. Since capital is immobile, the absolute ﬁrm sizes do not alter as well.
Are these two results also true for the developing South? According to
equations (6) and (8) the ﬁrm sizes for both the restricted entrepreneurs and
the entrepreneurs running the optimal plant size depend on the endogenous
ratio X = Y 1/σ/ρ. How does this ratio change when we move from autarky to
free trade? A decline of X would induce both the restricted and the unrestricted
entrepreneurs to cut their ﬁrm sizes. As a consequence, capital supply would
exceed capital demand. Parallel reasoning shows that also an increase in X
cannot occur in the new equilibrium. This means that the ﬁrm sizes as well as
the mark-ups are unaﬀected by the change in the trade regime.
The intuition behind this result is easy to see. Given the interest rate ρ,
t h ei n c r e a s ei nt h eg o o d sp r i c e sp(ω(j)) = Y 1/σk∗(ω(j))−1/σ, where world real







proves the access to external ﬁnance for the restricted individuals and induces
unrestricted individuals to manage larger ﬁrms. The capital demand curve shifts
to the right whereas capital supply remains constant since we assume that cap-
ital is immobile between the two regions. So, the interest rate rises. The jump
in the interest rate has exactly the opposite eﬀect on the ﬁrm sizes as the rise
in the prices, and it turns out that the net eﬀect is identically zero for all ﬁrms.
24This, again, is because the CES-Preferences imply that each ﬁrms experiences
the same increase in the market size when we move to a free trade regime. So,
our analysis shows that a central result of Dixit and Stiglitz type trade mod-
els, namely that there is little change in the scale of industrial sectors, holds in
presence of capital market imperfections and imperfect mobility of production
factors.
The impact on the income distribution is now easily derived. Since Y 1/σ
and ρ experience the same relative increase, equation (15) tells us that this is
also true for the incomes of the restricted and unrestricted entrepreneurs, re-
spectively. So, the trade liberalization increases the incomes of all entrepreneurs
by the same relative magnitude. The results derived in this subsection are sum-
marized in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 A move from autarky to free trade leaves the size-distribution
of ﬁrms and the relative incomes in the South unaﬀected provided that the en-
trepreneurs can sustain their monopoly power.
4.2 Perfect Substitutes
Both, the size-distribution of ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h er e l a t i v ei n c o m e sa r en ol o n g e r
unaﬀected by an integration if the goods produced in the two regions are perfect
substitutes and, as a consequence, all entrepreneurs are price takers.
Since we assume that aggregate capital endowment in the North is large,
worldwide investment into each good may equalize no matter what the level of
ﬁnancial development in the South is and no matter what the distribution of
capital endowments in the South looks like. So, as a result of the symmetry in
preferences and technology, the number of produced units of each good in the
North will adjust in such a way that, given production in the South, worldwide
output of each good is equal. Thus, the world real output is given by Y =
R 1
0 kWdj = kW =
R L
0 ω(i)di/L and, according to equation (4), the price of each
good equals 1. The exact production structure under free trade, as a result of
perfect competition an CRS-technology, remains indeterminate.
25S i n c ee a c hg o o dp r o d u c e dc a nb es o l da tt h ep r e v a l e n tw o r l dm a r k e tp r i c e ,
the interest rate in the South increases to 1, the marginal product of capital. As
a consequence, the function relating initial capital endowment to income takes
now the particularly simple form y(ω)=ω. Comparing this function to equa-
tion (12) we see that integration changes the income distribution. In Figure 4,
income under autarky as a function of capital endowment is shown for three
diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial development. Whereas the curve OD represents a
situation with inexistent capital markets, the curves OC and OB are drawn
for an intermediate level of λ and for λ ≥ σ−1
σ , respectively. The 45-degree
radiant (OA) shows the situation after the integration has taken place. The
properties of the ”income function” under autarky derived in Lemma (2) ensure
that there is exactly one crossing (from above) with the 45-degree radiant.11
So, with respect to changes in absolute income, the trade liberalization divides
entrepreneurs into two diﬀerent groups. Entrepreneurs with capital endowment
above some speciﬁc level ω∗ win whereas the poorer manufacturers lose. Of
course, the wealth level that separates winners from losers depends on the level
of ﬁnancial development as well as on the distribution of initial capital endow-
ments (see following subsection). However, the central result that there are two
groups whose members are aﬀected diﬀerently is independent of both ﬁnancial
development and the wealth distribution.
Proposition 5 A move from autarky to free trade divides the class of en-
trepreneurs into two groups. The incomes of owners of ”small” establishments
decrease whereas entrepreneurs running ”large” ﬁrms win.
Intuitively, under autarky the entrepreneurs face downward sloping demand
curves as a result of the monopolistic goods market structure. To escape strongly
decreasing marginal returns in the small home market, wealthy entrepreneurs
lend capital to entrepreneurs poorly endowed with capital at a rate that is (far)
below the physical marginal product of capital. This, in turn, leads not only
11Of course, if λ =0 , the incomes before and after the integration coincide a second time
at ω =0 .
26to a more even provision of goods but is also favourable to the incomes of the
”poor” borrowers. The removal of trade barriers alters the situation completely.
From the point of view of a single entrepreneur, all goods can now be sold (and
also bought) at a price of 1 on the large world market. Thus, access to the
competitive world market increases the prices of the large entrepreneurs’ goods
whereas the small manufacturers are conf r o n t e dw i t hd e c r e a s i n gp r i c e s . A sa
consequence, the rich are indiﬀerent between increasing their ﬁrm sizes (and
thereby shortening capital supply) or staying lenders (or both) at a rate of 1,
the marginal product of capital. That is the mechanism that led to relatively
favourable terms for borrowers ceases to exist.
4.3 Comparative Static Results
To gain insights about the political feasibility of trade liberalizations it is inter-
esting to ask both questions how large the number of losers is and how much
they lose. In the case of imperfect substitutes, there is a simple answer: Every-
body wins relatively the same. This result is true for any distribution of initial
capital endowments and any level of ﬁnancial development. As a consequence,
we expect trade liberalization policies to have strong support among manufac-
turers. As mentioned above, the situation becomes more complicated in the
case of perfect substitutes. It is true that the group size as well as the changes
in income depend in general on the eﬃciency of the capital market and on the
wealth distribution. The inﬂuence of these two factors is now discussed in turn.
Financial Development. A look at the polar cases in Figure 4, λ =0a n d
λ ≥ σ−1
σ , gives the basic relationship between the size of the group of the losers
and the level of ﬁnancial development. Given the distribution of initial capital
endowments, there are few losers if the capital market does not exist compared
to a situation with a near perfect capital market. In addition, in the former
case the negative impact on the income of the poor is small whereas the income
of the wealthier entrepreneurs rises dramatically when we move from autarky
to free trade. In the latter case, exactly the opposite is true.
27For intermediate levels of λ the threshold level ω∗ separating winners from
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lies in the linear part of y(ω)|λ>0 .12 Despite the globally positive relationship
between the threshold wealth level ω∗ and the level of ﬁnancial development,
ω∗ may fall locally at some intermediate levels of λ. T h i si sb e c a u s eo ft h e
interest rate eﬀect discussed in Subsection 3.1. However, it can be shown that
this may not happen when λ i sc l o s et o0o rc l o s et oσ−1
σ , i.e. ω∗ shifts to
the right when λ is increased from 0 to some arbitrary positve level and ω∗
approaches ω∗
B (see Figrue 4) from the left as λ goes to σ−1
σ . So, we conclude
that - given the wealth distribution - a higher level of ﬁnancial development is
(apart from local non-monotonies) associated with a higher number of losers of
a trade liberalization.
Wealth Distribution. How does a regressive transfer, i.e. more inequality
in the distribution of initial capital endowments (given the level of ﬁnancial de-
velopment), aﬀect the group sizes of the winners and the losers and the incomes
(incentives) of the respective group members? With respect to the group sizes,
there are two eﬀects. First, there is a direct eﬀect if the individuals suﬀering
from the transfer had an endowment above ω∗
old before the transfer and below
ω∗
new after the transfer. So, the direct eﬀect increases the number of losers.
Put diﬀerently, the more the distribution is skewed to the left the higher is the
number of individuals with capital endowment below ω∗. Second, there is an
indirect eﬀect that results from a change in ω∗. On the one hand, the regressive
transfer decreases ρ (Lemma 3) and therefore tends to increase ω∗. On the other
hand, a regressive transfer has possibly (but not necessarily, see Subsection 3.2)
a negative impact on Y and, as a result, tends to decrease ω∗. The strength
of the indirect eﬀect, i.e. how many individuals switch from losers to winners
12As long as σ−1
σ > ρ(1 −λ)+λ,t h eﬁrst regime is relevant. Note that, at λ =0 ,t h eL H S
is larger than the RHS whereas at λ ≥ σ−1
σ the LHS is smaller than the RHS. In addition,
the RHS is monotonically increasing in λ. So, as λ moves from 0 to σ−1
σ we switch from the
ﬁrst to the second regime.
28(or vice versa) due to a change in the threshold level ω∗, depends of course
on the density of the wealth distribution at ω∗
old. N o t e ,h o w e v e r ,t h a t ,g i v e n
ω∗
old lies somewhere in between the relatively poor entrepreneurs running small
establishments and the rich manufacturers, the indirect eﬀect may not play a
particular important role - at least not in developing countries. As mentioned
above, both the wealth distribution and the size-distribution of ﬁrms are char-
acterized by a missing middle suggesting that the mass of individuals at ω∗ is
small. Based on this argumentation we expect the number of individuals that
oppose a trade liberalization to be high if the wealth distribution (and therefore
the size-distribution of ﬁrms) is strongly polarized.
How does a regressive transfer aﬀect the incomes of the group members
(that are not involved into the transfer) under autarky? Again assuming that
the transfer has a negative impact on Y ,w eh a v et od i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nt h e
incomes of the borrowers and the lenders.13 Since both the interest rate and
the aggregate demand (by assumption) fall, the lenders which form the largest
part of individuals with capital endowment above ω∗ are clearly worse oﬀ.T h i s
suggests that most of the winners of trade liberalization beneﬁtm o r ef r o mt h i s
liberalization when the distribution is more unequal. The income of individuals
with a capital endowment below ω∗ (which are all borrowers) is hit by two
competing eﬀects. First, as it is the case with the lenders, the fall in Y decreases
the demand for their products. Second, the fall of the interest rate decreases
interest payments and therefore improves their income position. Even though it
is in general not clear, we see that there are good reasons to expect that the losers
of a trade liberalization lose more when the distribution is polarized. Based on
this we suggest that the distributional conﬂicts arising from a trade liberalization
are enforced by a more unequal distribution of capital endowments.
13Note that the relatively rich borrowers and all lenders have a capital endowment above
ω∗, i.e. it is always true that ω∗ ≤ e k.
295 Summary and Conclusions
We are interested in the distributional consequences of major trade liberaliza-
tions steps primarily in LDCs. The model developed here shows that trade
liberalizations removing monopoly power of manufacturers have asymmetric ef-
fects on the incomes of the two typical groups of manufacturers in an LDC.
Whereas the owners of large companies - being no longer restricted to the small
home market - win from an integration into a larger market, the owners of small
establishments (family businesses) lose. Their income is hit by two adverse ef-
fects. First, being relatively small compared to the economy-wide demand,
owners of micro ﬁrms face high relative prices under autarky. A signiﬁcant cut
back in trade barriers removes these high mark-ups and ensures that each good
can be bought at any quantity. Second, large manufacturers are no longer forced
to charge low domestic prices because of their scale of production. Instead, the
integration into a large market allows them to sell any quantity at the preva-
lent price. This leads them to run even larger ﬁrms and, as a consequence, to
increase factor demand. The rising factor prices, in particular the rise of the
interest rate, hurts the small borrowers.
The analysis so far leads us the conclusion that the number of entrepreneurs
opposing trade liberalizations because of adverse income eﬀects hinges crucially
on the wealth distribution. A very polarized distribution giving rise to a large
number of micro and small entrepreneurs is associated with a large number of
opposers and only a small winning group. As a further important determinant
of the size of the winning and loosing group, respectively, we identify the level
of ﬁnancial development. Poor law enforcement giving rise to highly imperfect
or even absent capital markets leads to an ineﬃcient production structure un-
der autarky thereby limiting the number of losers. In addition, large eﬃciency
gains due to an integration give the winners (losers) strong (weak) incentives to
participate in the political process. However, the way the division into winners
and losers of a trade liberalization translates into policy outcomes depends, in
turn, on the political economy of the country under consideration. If decision
30making in a country is reasonably well characterized by the median-voter ap-
proach we expect high inequality and a protectionist policy to go hand in hand.
However, if democracy is not well established and the few economically power-
ful exert disproportionate or decisive political power, we would expect exactly
the opposite relationship. Furthermore, protectionist pressure is weak when law
enforcement is poor and, as a consequence, capital markets are hardly devel-
oped. Thus, given these comparative static results and the fact that a weak
rule of law (and hence malfunctioning capital markets) and weak democratic
institutions go hand in hand, we expect a negative inequality-openness relation-
ship in relatively democratic LDCs and positive relationship in less democratic
countries.
In pointing out that the losers (in terms of short-run income reductions) of
major trade liberalization steps may be the owners of small-scale enterprises this
paper helps to understand how a protectionist trade regime may be overcome in
the political process. An important implication that can be drawn is that trade
liberalizations should be accompanied by measures that prevent the incomes of
the small from falling. In particular, we suggest that developing countries should
choose policies that remove widespread discrimination of small ﬁr m ss u c ha sa
disproportionate tax burden or poor access to the banking system.
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Figure 4 – Winners and Losers of a Trade Liberalization 
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